Introduction
Each time the Rithala case comes up within the information, I learn the headlines and really feel an odd mixture of frustration and resignation.
The protection all the time frames it the identical method: “large energy firm tries to invoice customers for a plant that stopped working.”
This story has been so simplistically framed that it’s straightforward to be outraged about.
However I used to be on the within of tasks like this (not this one) for a few years. And I wish to let you know how a Venture Engineer sees this entire episode.
I’ll not current any authorized arguments. I’ll current to you simply the numbers. Why?
As a result of I believe the numbers inform the actual story higher than any courtroom does.
Let me current how I’m seeing this story from the attitude of a Venture Engineer. A deeper understanding of this story (in my method) may even assist traders to get a sensible understanding of the utility of depreciation.
The Quantity That Began Every little thing: Rs. 320.17 Crore
This was the undertaking value – Rs. 320.17 crore roughly.
Now, earlier than you react to that quantity, let me provide the context.
It’s 2007. Delhi is going through severe energy shortages. The Commonwealth Video games are coming. The federal government has instructed distribution firms that you’re now answerable for arranging your personal energy.
Not simply distributing it. Arranging it.
So Tata Energy (TPDDL) checked out choices.
- Constructing a model new gas-based plant takes too lengthy and prices much more.
- Somebody identifies a second-hand mixed cycle energy plant obtainable out of China by means of an organization known as UNIONIX (Far East).
The undertaking crew did the maths.
Second-hand procurement would value roughly 30% lower than a brand new plant. The federal government of Delhi desires this finished quick.
There may be additionally a Supreme Court docket order within the background directing distribution firms to make sure sufficient provide.
So TPDDL transfer forward.
The acquisition order goes to UNIONIX in November 2007. The land at Rithala, about 6 acres, is being organized by means of DDA. Clearances are being chased in parallel.
- Environmental approvals,
- NOCs,
- Chimney top permissions,
- Manufacturing unit licenses, and many others.
That is the way in which all the equipment of a big infrastructure undertaking normally runs.
By the point all of this lands on paper, the whole undertaking value is Rs. 320.17 crore.
I believe, by this time, this isn’t an estimated value on a spreadsheet. This worth is after the next steps:
- Contracts signed,
- Tools shipped,
- Customs obligation paid,
- Civil work finished,
- Fuel connections negotiated.
And right here is the factor about infrastructure tasks. The cash as soon as spent doesn’t come again if the undertaking fails.
It isn’t like shopping for stock that you would be able to return.
When you pour concrete and fee generators, that capital is dedicated.
The Quantity That Quietly Modified Every little thing: Rs. 197.70 Crore
That is the quantity DERC (Delhi Electrical energy Regulatory Fee) permitted.
Not Rs. 320 crore. Rs. 197.70 crore.
Instantly, a niche of greater than Rs. 122 crore opened up between what TPDDL believed can be spent and what the regulator stated customers ought to bear.
Now, I wish to be sincere right here. Regulators do that. It’s their job.
They independently confirm capital prices. They query whether or not procurement was finished by means of correct tender processes.
In TPDDL’s case, there was a selected subject: the second-hand plant was procured by means of negotiation with UNIONIX, not by means of an open aggressive tender as required beneath the licence circumstances.
DERC may need held that towards TPDDL whereas computing the permitted capital value.
Have been they improper to query it? Technically, no. Did it sting TPDDL? Completely.
From contained in the undertaking, I believe TPDDL wouldn’t have been performing irresponsibly. They have been simply shifting quick beneath specific authorities route to unravel an emergency.
The Delhi authorities had itself advisable this undertaking quickly in July 2007.
The Ministry of Energy had written to the fuel ministry to allocate fuel for the plant, particularly for the Commonwealth Video games necessities.
However regulators function on course of. And TPDDL most likely skipped a course of step. So, Rs. 320 crore turned Rs. 197.70 crore for billing functions.
I have no idea what was the rationale why TPDDL nonetheless went forward with the undertaking. Perhaps it was a boardroom resolution that only a few would possibly know. No less than it’s not in public.
The Quantity That Outlined Our Enterprise Case: 15 Years
Virtually each energy plant undertaking is modelled round a depreciation interval.
For gas-based crops of this sort, the usual technical helpful life beneath Indian regulatory frameworks is 15 years.
This isn’t an arbitrary quantity. It displays an engineering actuality of Infrastructure orojects in India.
A correctly maintained mixed cycle fuel plant genuinely lasts 15 to twenty years beneath regular working circumstances.
The tools is constructed for it. The upkeep schedules assume it.
So when you find yourself constructing the monetary mannequin of a undertaking like this, you construction your value restoration over 15 years. The undertaking lead would inform the finance crew that the permitted capital value will likely be depreciated at roughly 6% every year.
The annual restoration from tariffs will cowl a slice of the capital annually.
By 12 months 15, you’ve gotten recovered the complete permitted value.
With Rs. 197.70 crore because the capital base and 15 years because the restoration horizon, the tough annual depreciation comes out to someplace within the vary of Rs. 13 to fifteen crore per 12 months.
[I am stating this as a project-level assumption. I have never personally worked in TPDDL. I do not know their financial model meeting. But this is standard infrastructure project modelling logic, and I am confident this is how the project economics were structured.]
Now right here is the vital factor.
DERC itself, in its remaining order of August 2017, acknowledged that the helpful lifetime of the plant is 15 years.
I believe this confirmed TPDDL’s engineering evaluation.
However what TPDDL couldn’t have absolutely anticipated in 2007 is what the subsequent quantity would do to all of this.
The Quantity That Broke the Mannequin: 6 Years
Six years of precise industrial provide to Delhi customers.
That’s all TPDDL acquired.
- The plant was commissioned in mixed cycle mode in September 2011.
- The Energy Buy Settlement was permitted for a interval ending March 2018.
- So, efficient industrial billing was roughly from late 2011 to March 2018.
Six years. In opposition to a 15-year depreciation assumption.
Now sit with that for a second.
You might have a capital asset constructed to final 15 years. Your complete value restoration mannequin is structured over 15 years. However you’re instructed that shopper billing will solely be permitted for six years.
That isn’t a minor accounting adjustment. That may be a structural rupture in all the undertaking economics.
And that is the place I wish to say one thing truthfully, as a result of it is vital.
The land was all the time non permanent. TPDDL knew that. The federal government had acknowledged from the start that the land would revert to DDA after 5 to 6 years. So the operational tenure was all the time meant to be restricted.
However right here is my assumption:
I don’t consider any severe infrastructure crew accepts a 15-year depreciation framework and concurrently assumes that solely 6 years of billing will really occur.
That mixture merely doesn’t work financially.
Somebody, and I’m assuming this was the interior planning logic, will need to have both anticipated the association to be prolonged past 2018. Or, anticipated that the regulatory framework would shield the remaining unrecovered capital by means of some type of continued depreciation billing even after the availability interval ended.
As a result of if you understand from day one which the billing window is just 6 years, you don’t mannequin depreciation over 15, proper?
You both compress the restoration, or you don’t do the undertaking in any respect at that capital stage.
That is fundamental undertaking finance logic.
The Quantity That Confirmed the Mismatch: Rs. 83.34 Crore
By the point March 2018 arrived, TPDDL recovered solely Rs. 83.34 crore in cumulative depreciation from customers.
At 6% every year (=1/15 × 100) on Rs. 197.70 crore, the annual restoration was roughly Rs. 11.86 crore per 12 months. Over roughly 7 years of depreciation billing, that accumulates to round Rs. 83 crore. The mathematics is constant.
However here’s what that quantity additionally tells you:
In opposition to an permitted capital base of Rs. 197.70 crore, TPDDL had recovered lower than half.
- Rs. 83.34 crore in.
- Rs. 197.70 crore was the baseline.
TPDDL was barely previous the midpoint of capital restoration when the billing window closed.
For any engineer or undertaking skilled studying this, you understand precisely what that appears like.
It’s like constructing a freeway, accumulating tolls for six years, after which being instructed the toll plaza is being shut down, regardless that greater than half the development value remains to be excellent on the stability sheet.
The Quantity That Went to the Supreme Court docket: Rs. 94.59 Crore
That is the quantity. That is what all the case was finally about.
- Rs. 197.70 crore permitted.
- Minus Rs. 83.34 crore recovered.
- Equals Rs. 94.59 crore nonetheless sitting on the books. Unrecovered.
DERC stated in November 2019 that customers is not going to pay this. The plant stopped supplying. The billing relationship ended. Finish of story.
TPDDL stated: “We constructed infrastructure beneath an permitted regulatory framework. A big a part of the permitted value remains to be unrecovered. This can not merely be written off.“
And either side, truthfully, had a degree.
Why TPDDL Fought This All of the Method to the Supreme Court docket
I wish to tackle this straight, as a result of that is the query most individuals (I believe) on the surface is not going to perceive.
Why would an organization spend years combating a regulatory case over Rs. 94.59 crore once they knew that the plant was not supplying energy to Delhi customers anymore?
The simple reply is: as a result of Rs. 94.59 crore is some huge cash.
However that isn’t the complete reply.
[What I am about to say is partly my interpretation. These are not direct statements from TPDDL management. But having worked in projects for many years, this is what I believe the internal reasoning looked like.]
The true reply is about precedent, not simply cash.
Infrastructure companies in India function on a basic assumption: in the event you make investments capital beneath a regulated framework, you’ll get well that capital. The complete mannequin of personal participation in energy infrastructure rests on this. Buyers commit long-term capital as a result of they belief that the regulatory framework will honour value restoration over the asset’s permitted helpful life.
If a court docket or regulator can say, your billing window ended, your unrecovered capital is your drawback, then each future infrastructure undertaking in India turns into more durable to finance.
As a result of the subsequent set of traders and lenders will ask: what if this occurs to us? What if the industrial association ends early and the regulator refuses additional restoration?
And that uncertainty will get priced into the price of capital. This ultimately makes infrastructure costlier for everybody.
I believe TPDDL was combating for this precept as a lot as for the Rs. 94.59 crore itself.
And APTEL (Appellate Tribunal for Electrical energy) really agreed with TPDDL in February 2025. APTEL stated: DERC itself acknowledged 15 years because the helpful life. You can not prohibit depreciation to six years when you’ve gotten permitted 15 years because the asset life. That’s inconsistent.
Although I’ve not learn the complete order of APTEL, I do know that the order went in favour of TPDDL
Why the Plant May Not Proceed Past 2018
I ought to tackle this, too, as a result of it’s a honest query.
If the unrecovered capital was this vital, why not merely lengthen the plant’s operation?
The brief reply is that a number of issues had modified by 2018 that made this virtually very troublesome.
- The land was all the time meant to be non permanent. The DDA had initially conveyed that land for a restricted interval. Persevering with operation would have required the land association to be renegotiated at a stage above TPDDL’s management.
- The fuel provide association was additionally not everlasting. The fuel allocation that supported the plant had been particularly tied to the Delhi emergency context. By 2018, that particular association had expired.
- And maybe most importantly, the economics of Delhi’s energy sector had shifted. Cheaper energy was obtainable from different sources by 2018. The regulator had no robust purpose to approve continued costly gas-based technology when lower-cost alternate options existed.
[I am assuming here: I do not have confirmed documents stating exactly why the extension did not happen. But based on what is publicly available, these are the most plausible reasons. If there was a stronger commercial case for extension in 2018, TPDDL would certainly have pursued it, because extending operation was always the easier path to recovery compared to litigation.]
What This Case Taught Me About Depreciation
I had been in tasks for a very long time.
And I wish to let you know one thing that no finance textbook ever instructed me clearly.
Depreciation isn’t just an accounting entry. It’s a promise.
When a regulator approves a capital value and a helpful life, what they’re actually approving is: this firm will get well this quantity, over this a few years, by means of shopper tariffs. That’s the promise embedded in each depreciation schedule.
The Rithala case was about what occurs when that promise will get interrupted earlier than it’s fulfilled.
And the Supreme Court docket, in Might 2026, basically stated: when the availability stops, the promise to customers additionally stops. You can not acquire for one thing you aren’t offering.
I perceive that ruling. I don’t absolutely agree with each implication of it for future infrastructure tasks. However I perceive it.
What I hope policymakers and regulators take from this case is the opposite facet of the lesson:
“If you would like personal capital to circulation into infrastructure, the regulatory framework must take care of this mismatch extra explicitly from the start. The hole between technical life, regulatory life, and industrial life shouldn’t be a theoretical drawback. It’s a actual monetary threat that confirmed up as Rs. 94.59 crore on somebody’s stability sheet.”
I do know, for a corporation as large as Tata Energy, arranging for a Rs. 94.59 crore provision within the stability sheet shouldn’t be a giant factor. However I actually really feel sorry for the Venture Inchange beneath whom this loss has been booked.
Conclusion
Six numbers. That’s all this case was.
- Rs. 320.17 crore.
- Rs. 197.70 crore.
- 15 years.
- 6 years.
- Rs. 83.34 crore.
- Rs. 94.59 crore.
Each authorized argument, each regulatory petition, each attraction, all of them orbit these six numbers.
The engineering was not the issue. The plant labored. It provided energy for six years. That a part of the story is definitely successful.
However I believe the issue was that the monetary mannequin assumed one thing the industrial actuality couldn’t ship. And when these two issues stopped matching, a niche of Rs. 94.59 crore ended up in a courtroom.
That’s the actual lesson from Rithala.
I do know it’s not nearly depreciation, however all of the ache originated from this angle solely.
Once I first learn this story, it made me see depreciation from a unique angle than simply as a “non-cash expense.” This is the reason I assumed to incorporate my understanding in a weblog.
Thanks for studying it by means of.
Have a contented investing.
